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NOTE
MAY I BE EXCUSED? SMITH'S
INDIVIDUALIZED GOVERNMENTAL
ASSESSMENT EXCEPTION AND THE HHS
MANDATE
MARY E. MCMAHONt
"No provision in our constitution ought to be dearer to man than

that which protects the rights of conscience against the
enterprises of the civil authority."1

INTRODUCTION
"Let's honor the conscience of those who disagree with
abortion, and draft a sensible conscience clause, and make sure
that all of our health care policies are grounded not only in sound
science, but also in clear ethics, as well as respect for the equality
of women."2 President Obama made this statement during his
2009 commencement speech at the University of Notre Dame on
May 17, 2009. While his invitation to speak at Notre Dame upset
some Catholics due to his pro-choice positions,3 many Catholic
leaders were heartened by the President's words regarding the
need to draft a "sensible conscience clause" in healthcare
legislation in order to protect the consciences of religious groups

t J.D., 2014, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., 2011, Loyola University
Maryland.
I Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Society of the Methodist Episcopal
Church at New London, Conn. (Feb. 4, 1809), available at http://www.con
source.org/document/to-the-society-of-the-methodist-episcopa-church-at-new-ondon
-connecticut-1809-2-4120130122082649/.
2 President Barack Obama, Notre Dame Speech (May 17, 2009), available at
http://www.chicagotribune.com/chi-barack-obama-notre-dame-speech-story.html#
page=1.
' Cathy Lynn Grossman, Notre Dame's Obama Invite Outrages Some Catholics,
USA TODAY (Mar. 24, 2009, 1:27 PM), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/
religion/post/2009/03/64571525/1#.U~hxUD7RLR8x.
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and individuals opposed to abortion and contraception.4 In fact,
when the battle for President Obama's controversial healthcare
bill, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA"), was
raging, many Catholic Bishops said they supported the bill for its
guarantee of universal healthcare coverage, provided, of course,
that it also prohibited federally funded abortions and included
conscience provisions.5
Now, just over five years after President Obama's speech at
Notre Dame, and four years after the ACA was signed into law,
many Catholics feel deceived.' In fact, the University of Notre
Dame, the very school that warmly welcomed President Obama
to speak only a few years ago, has sued the Department of Health
and Human Services ("HHS") over the President's signature law,
in response to what it perceives to be an affront to its religious
liberty.' The University of Notre Dame is not alone: Over 300
plaintiffs representing more than ninety organizations or
businesses with various religious backgrounds have brought
lawsuits in federal courts around the country against HHS, its
former and current Secretaries Kathleen Sebelius and Sylvia
Burwell, and other executive agencies.'

' Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius (No.
3:12CV253), 2012 WL 1859163, at *71. Notre Dame's complaint states that
President Obama's signing of Executive Order 13,535, which provided that no
executive agency would authorize the funding of abortion services, "was consistent
with a 2009 speech that [he] gave at Notre Dame, in which he indicated that his
Administration would honor the conscience of those who disagree with abortion, and
draft sensible conscience clauses." Id.
- Don Clemmer, Yet Another Healthcare Round-Up, U.S. CONF. OF CATHOLIC
BISHOPS BLOG (Mar. 18, 2010, 3:26 PM), http://usccbmedia.blogspot.com/
2010/03/yet-another-health-care-round-up.html.
6 Benjamin Mann, President Accused of Breaking Notre Dame 'Conscience'
Pledge, CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY (Nov. 20, 2011, 5:28 PM), http://www.catholic
newsagency.com/news/president-accused-of-breaking-notre-dame-conscience-pledge/.
See generally Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 743 F.3d 547 (7th Cir. 2014).
8 See HHS Mandate Information Central, BECKET FUND, http'//www.becket
fund.org/hhsinformationcentrall (last visited Jan. 26, 2015). Plaintiffs contesting the
HHS Mandate have had rather good results. As of February 2015, there have been
fifty rulings on cases brought by for-profit businesses, which, most importantly,
includes a Supreme Court victory by the plaintiffs in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). Id. There have also been fifty-six lawsuits filed by
nonprofit organizations, including various dioceses and universities. As of February
2015, thirty-one of these organizations have had their motions for injunctive relief
granted, while nine have had theirs denied. Id. Several other cases have been
dismissed for procedural issues. Id.
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The Supreme Court has already decided one case on the
matter, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,' in which it
concluded that HHS's regulations requiring all non-exempt
businesses and organizations to provide coverage of certain
contraceptives ("HHS Mandate") violate the rights of closely-held
corporations under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
("RFRA"), if those closely-held corporations object to the
regulations based on the sincerely-held religious beliefs of their
shareholders."° The Hobby Lobby decision has not brought an
end to the controversy over the HHS Mandate, however. Many
lawsuits, including those by non-profit organizations like the
University of Notre Dame, are still pending. 1
Though the ACA is notoriously long and complex,1 the
reason for these lawsuits is relatively straightforward. The ACA
requires a "group health plan and a health insurance issuer
offering group or individual health insurance coverage" to
provide coverage, without any cost sharing requirements, for
women's "preventive care and screenings." 3 These "preventive
services" are laid out in "comprehensive guidelines" supported by
the Health Resources and Services Administration ("HRSA"), an
agency of HHS. 14 In other words, HHS mandates that all nonexempt employers provide insurance coverage free of charge for
the preventive services contained in the guidelines.
The
controversy over this requirement stems from the fact that the
preventive services mandated by HHS include coverage for
contraceptives, abortifacients, and sterilization, along with
related patient education and counseling,'5 some or all of which
violate the core tenets of a variety of religious denominations.
9 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
10

Id.

at 2759.

1 Mark Sherman & Rachel Zoll, After Hobby Lobby, Nonprofits' Contraceptive
Cases up Next for Supreme Court, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (July 6, 2014, 6:54 PM),
http://www.dallasnews.com/news/washington/20140706-after-hobby-lobby-nonprofits
-contraceptive-cases-up-next-for-supreme-court.ece;
see
also HHS Mandate
Information Central, supra note 8.
12 Rick Newman, The Real Reason Obamacare Scares People, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (Mar. 23, 2012, 1:52 PM EDT), http://www.usnews.com/newsblogs/ricknewmanl2012/03/23/the-real-reason-obamacare-scares-people.
'" See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2713,
124 Stat. 119 (2010).
14 Id.
1 See Women's Preventive Services Guidelines, U.S. DEPARTMENT HEALTH &
HUM. SERVICES: HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVICES ADMIN., http:Jlwww.hrsa.gov/
womensguidelines/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2015).
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While it is true that there is a religious exemption to the
HHS Mandate, established at the discretion of HRSA, it is
narrow, 16 essentially only covering actual church organizations
themselves (such as houses of worship) and "their integrated
auxiliaries, and conventions or associations of churches," and
"the exclusively religious activities of any religious order."17 The
exemption does not extend to the vast majority of religiously
affiliated organizations such as universities, hospitals, and
charities.18
16 See 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(a) (2014) ("For purposes of this paragraph (a), a
'religious employer' is an organization that is organized and operates as a nonprofit
entity and is referred to in section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, as amended."). Section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) refers to "churches, their
integrated auxiliaries, and conventions or associations of churches," while section
6033(a)(3)(A)(iii) refers to "the exclusively religious activities of any religious order."
26 U.S.C. § 6033 (2012). The previous definition of "religious employer," which was
changed when the HHS Mandate was finalized on June 28, 2013, stated:
[A] 'religious employer' is an organization that meets all of the following
criteria: (1) The inculcation of religious values is the purpose of the
organization. (2) The organization primarily employs persons who share
the religious tenets of the organization. (3) The organization serves
primarily persons who share the religious tenets of the organization.
(4) The organization is a nonprofit organization as described in section
6033(a)(1) and section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986, as amended.
45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv)(B) (2011).
17 See 26 U.S.C. § 6033.
18 See id.; 4 W. Cole Durham & Robert Smith, RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND
THE LAW § 17:4 (2012). While this is an updated and "simplified" definition of
"religious employer," see DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. ET AL., COVERAGE OF
CERTAIN PREVENTIVE SERVICES UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT [hereinafter
FINAL RULES], it merely clarifies that "[a] house of worship is exempted even if it
provides charitable social services to, or employs, persons of different religious
faiths." Thus, the new definition does not expand the universe of group health plans
that qualify for the exemption beyond that which was originally intended. See
Women's Preventive Services Coverage and Non-Profit Religious Organizations,
CENTERS
FOR
MEDICARE
&
MEDICAID
SERVICES,
http://www.cms.gov/
CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets-and-FAQs/womens-preven-02012013.html (last visited
Jan. 28, 2015). Additionally, the numerous lawsuits by religiously affiliated
nonprofit organizations contesting the HHS Mandate prove that the "religious
employer" exemption rarely extends beyond houses of worship. See Laurie
Goodstein, Catholics File Suits on Contraceptive Coverage, N.Y. TIMES (May 21,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/22/us/catholic-groups-file-suits-on-contra
ceptive-coverage.html?ref=contraception&_r=l& ("In an effort to show a unified
front in their campaign against the birth control mandate, 43 Roman Catholic
dioceses, schools, social service agencies and other institutions filed lawsuits in 12
federal courts on Monday, challenging the Obama administration's rule that their
employees receive coverage for contraception in their health insurance policies.");
HHS Mandate Information Central, supra note 8. On June 28, 2013, after much
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discussion, the Obama administration introduced an "accommodation" for nonexempt religiously affiliated institutions objecting to the HHS Mandate. See
45 C.F.R. § 147.131; FINAL RULES, supra; News Release, U.S. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., Administration Issues Final Rules on Contraception Coverage and
Religious Organizations (June 28, 2013), available at http://www.hhs.gov/
news/press/2013pres/06/20130628a.html.
Under these
rules, self-certifying
.nonprofit religious organizations that qualify for [the] accommodations are not
required to contract, arrange, pay, or refer for contraceptive coverage; however, plan
participants and beneficiaries (or student enrollees and their covered dependents)
will still benefit from separate payments for contraceptive services without cost
sharing or other charge." See FINAL RULES, supra. In other words, the
accommodation creates a system in which qualifying institutions, such as some
religiously affiliated hospitals, charities, and schools, will not have to pay or be
involved in providing contraceptive coverage. Instead, the institutions' insurance
providers or third-party administrators must provide the coverage "without cost
sharing, premium, fee, or other charge to plan participants or beneficiaries or to the
eligible organization or its plan." See id. Despite this, the majority of religiously
affiliated nonprofit institutions that oppose the HHS Mandate have not accepted the
aaccommodation" as an adequate means of protecting their religiously-based
objections. See, e.g., Press Release, The Beckett Fund, Final HHS Rule Fails To
Protect Constitutional Rights of Millions of Americans (June 28, 2013), availableat
http/www.becketfund.org/becket-welcomes-opportunity-to-study-final-rule-on-hhsmandate/ (stating that the Final Rules continue to make nonprofit religious
employers the "gatekeepers" to abortion); USCCB Finds Continued Major Problems
in HHS Mandate's 'Final Rule,' CATHOLICCULTURE.ORG
(July 4, 2013),
http://www.catholicculture.org/news/headlines/index.cfm?storyid=18353.
For more
information on the "accommodation" and Final Rules, see FINAL RULES, supra;
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE ON THE TEMPORARY ENFORCEMENT
SAFE HARBOR FOR CERTAIN EMPLOYERS, GROUP HEALTH PLANS AND GROUP HEALTH
INSURANCE ISSUERS WITH RESPECT TO THE REQUIREMENT To COVER
CONTRACEPTIVE
SERVICES WITHOUT COST SHARING (2013), available at
http//www.becketfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/preventive-services-guidance
-6-28-2013.pdf. The Final Rules were updated once again on August 27, 2014, when
HHS issued "Interim Final Rules." See 45 C.F.R. § 147.131 (2014), available at
https://federalregister.gov/a/2014-20252. This update is similar to the original
"accommodation," but is simpler in that it allows religious organizations to file a
letter with HHS stating the organization's religious objection to the HHS Mandate.
Id.; see also Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, Women's Preventive Services
Coverage and Non-Profit Religious Organizations, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVICES, available at http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheetsand-FAQs/womens-preven-02012013.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2015). After the letter
is filed, HHS or the Department of Labor will order the organization's insurer or a
third-party administrator to provide contraceptive services to the organization's
employees at no cost. Id. The Interim Final Rules were written largely in reaction to
the Supreme Court's decision to grant an emergency injunction for Wheaton College,
a Christian academic institution. Id. In Wheaton College v. Burwell, the Supreme
Court held that "pending final disposition of appellate review," Wheaton College was
not required to comply with the HHS Mandate as long as it informed HHS in writing
"that it is a non-profit organization that holds itself out as religious and has
religious objections to providing coverage for contraceptive services." 134 S. Ct. 2806,
2807, 2814 (2014). As with the Final Rules, the Interim Final Rules have not
mollified religious organizations, as they still contend that they should be exempted
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Likewise, religiously devout business owners are also subject
to the HHS Mandate. 19 This, of course, puts these religious
individuals and organizations in a serious bind: They must
choose between complying with the law in violation of their
deeply held religious convictions, refusing to comply in the face of
very hefty penalties,2 ° or shutting down their organizations
completely.
The religious employers who have brought lawsuits in
response to the HHS Mandate have made a variety of arguments
as to why the HHS Mandate should be struck down, including
assertions that it violates RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment. In Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court
completely from complying with the Mandate. See, e.g., CNS Staff, Newman Society
Releases Statement on New HHS Mandate Accommodation, CARDINAL NEWMAN
Soc'Y (Aug.
28,
2014,
5:09
PM),
available at
http://www.cardinal
newmansociety.org/CatholicEducationDaily/DetailsPage/tabid/102/ArticleID/3500/N
ewman-Society-Releases-Statement-on-New-HHS-Mandate-Accommodation.aspx
(noting that the new proposal does not provide an exemption for religious objectors,
which it states "is the only acceptable condition for the protection of religious
freedom").
19 See 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv). As noted, however, after the Supreme
Court's decision in Hobby Lobby, closely-held for-profit businesses whose
shareholders object to the HHS Mandate on sincere religious grounds are not
required to comply with its requirements. See generally Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). In August 2014, in response to the Supreme
Court's decision, HHS published proposed rules, which would establish an
"accommodation" for closely-held for-profit entities objecting to the Mandate. See 79
FR 51118 (Aug. 27, 2014), available at https://federalregister.gov/a/2014-20254; Ctr.
for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, Women's Preventive Services Coverage and
Non-Profit Religious Organizations, supra note 18. The "accommodation" would be
similar to the one created for non-profit religious organizations. 79 FR 51118; see
supra note 18. From the perspective of closely-held businesses like Hobby Lobby,
such an "accommodation" would be a step down from their current status, as such
entities are currently completely exempt from the HHS Mandate after the Supreme
Court's decision. See, e.g., "Comments on Proposed Rules on Coverage of Certain
Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act," United States Conference of
Catholic Bishops, Office of the General Counsel (Oct. 8, 2014), available at
http://www.usccb.org/about/general-counsel/rulemaking/upload/2014.hhs-comments_
on-proposed-rule-on-for-profits-10-8.pdf (noting that the proposed rules would once
again subject closely-held for-profit organizations to the HHS Mandate, while they
are currently exempt).
20 See 26 U.S.C. § 4980H; 26 U.S.C. § 4980D; 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132 (West 2014);
see also F. James Sensenbrenner, Affordable Care Act Gives Government Permission
To Play the Bully, Fox NEWS (Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2012/
0 8 /01/affordable-care-act-gives-government-permission-to-play-bully
("[The ACA]
authorizes our government to tax employers to the tune of $100 per day, per
employee for failing to comply with the HHS mandate. That equals an astounding
$36,500 per employee, per year.").
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based its decision solely on RFRA, and did not address the free
exercise argument.21 This Note analyzes an alternative ground
the Court could have relied upon in reaching a similar
conclusion. Specifically, this Note only focuses on one particular
assertion relating to the free exercise argument.
More
particularly, this Note concentrates on the claim that the HHS
Mandate should not apply to organizations and businesses that
object to it as a violation of their religious consciences because
the HHS Mandate falls under the "individualized governmental
assessment exception" set forth in the Supreme Court's landmark
free exercise case Employment Division v. Smith.22
While Smith has been criticized by many proponents of
broad religious liberty for its holding that "neutral, generally
applicable" laws are presumptively constitutional,23 even if they
place an incidental burden on the free exercise of religious
individuals, Smith did provide several exceptions to that rule,
one being the "individualized governmental assessment
exception."24 Unfortunately for lower courts, the Court did little
to define the scope of this exception, resulting in a wide array of
interpretations. This Note examines how the lower courts have
generally
interpreted
the exception,
and how such
interpretations will be applied in the context of the HHS
Mandate.
Part I of this Note explores the state of free exercise
jurisprudence prior to Smith, followed by an examination of the
Court's decision in Smith and the background of the
"individualized governmental assessment exception." Part II
examines several circuit court decisions representing both the
broad and narrow interpretations of the exception. Part III
analyzes the interpretations discussed in Part II, particularly in
the context of the HHS Mandate, and ultimately argues that the

See generally Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990).
23 See, e.g., Vincent Martin Bonventre, The Fall of Free Exercise: From 'No Law'
to Compelling Interests to Any Law Otherwise Valid, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1399, 1414
(2007) ("[Tlhe nation's constitutional promise of religious free exercise is no longer
guaranteed special protection. No longer is free exercise safeguarded under the
Constitution against routine government interests. No longer must state courts
subject infringements upon free exercise to the compelling-interest test; in fact, no
longer may federal courts do so to infringements by state governments.").
24 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
21
22
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broad interpretation, which gives individuals more extensive
religious freedoms, is more consistent with the aims of the First
Amendment's Free Exercise Clause.
I.

BACKGROUND

The Supreme Court's decision in Smith drastically changed
the way the judiciary interpreted the scope of the Free Exercise
Clause, substantially weakening the extent of its protections, at
least according to many First Amendment scholars.25 This ruling
was controversial in that it essentially "cast aside almost three
decades of free exercise jurisprudence."26 This Section first
describes the state of the Free Exercise Clause prior to Smith,
before examining Smith itself and the changes it made to free
exercise jurisprudence. Finally, and most importantly for the
purposes of this Note, this Section also explores the birth of the
"individualized governmental assessment exception" in Smith.
A.

Free Exercise Jurisprudence:Pre-Smith
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, as its
name suggests, protects the right of individuals to freely exercise
their religious beliefs. More specifically, it limits Congress's
power to interfere with religious practice, stating, "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof."27 While the Supreme
Court's pre-Smith free exercise jurisprudence was at times
inconsistent, and certainly not always strongly protective of
broad religious freedoms, 8 the law settled down considerably just
under thirty years before the Court's decision in Smith.29 This
stabilization of free exercise jurisprudence, which, at least in
21 See Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise Is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise: Smith,
Lukumi, and the General Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850, 850
(2001) ("According to the conventional wisdom in the community of First
Amendment scholars, in Employment Division v. Smith the Supreme Court
'abandoned' its longstanding commitment to protecting the free exercise of religion
and 'created a legal framework for persecution' of religious dissenters.") (footnotes
omitted).
26 See id. at 851.
27 U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
28 See Bonventre, supra note 23, at 1404.
29 See Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise and Individualized Exemptions: Herein
of Smith, Sherbert, Hogwarts, and Religious Liberty, 83 NEB. L. REV. 1178, 1180

(2005).
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theory, favored rather broad protections for religious liberty, was
a result of the Court's decision in the 1963 case Sherbert v.
30
Verner.
Sherbert was a case in which a Seventh-day Adventist in
South Carolina was denied unemployment benefits because she
refused to accept employment that required her to work on
Saturdays, her religion's Sabbath.3 1
The South Carolina
Unemployment Compensation Act disqualified those applicants
who, "without good cause," failed to accept "suitable work" that
had been offered to them.3 2 Her religiously motivated reason for
rejecting "suitable work" was deemed to be without "good cause,"
making her ineligible to receive the benefits.33 The Supreme
Court declared that this denial of benefits required the plaintiff
to make an impermissible choice "between following the precepts
of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and
abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept
work, on the other hand."3 4
The Court held that this
infringement of free exercise failed under the "compelling state
interest" test, in which "only the gravest abuses, endangering
paramount interest[s]" could validate even an incidental burden
on religious practice.3 5 In other words, the Court ruled that free
exercise cases are subject to strict scrutiny, and a burden on free
exercise is upheld only when the government demonstrates that
the law in question is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
state interest. 6
After Sherbert, the compelling interest test in free exercise
jurisprudence became the norm. 37 The Supreme Court affirmed
this about a decade later in Wisconsin v. Yoder,"8 a 1972 case
dealing with the application of compulsory state education law to
Amish students, whose parents' religious beliefs dictated that
their children be free from secular influences beyond the basic

Id.
31Id. at 1181.
32 Id. (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 401 (1963)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
33 Id. (quoting Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 401) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (quoting Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404) (internal quotation mark omitted).
35 See Bonventre, supra note 23, at 1410 (alteration in original) (quoting
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406) (internal quotation marks omitted).
36 See Duncan, supranote 29.
31 See Bonventre, supra note 23, at 1410-11.
38 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
30
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reading, writing, and math skills taught through eighth grade. 9
The Court held that although the state of Wisconsin clearly had
an interest in educating its citizens beyond the eighth grade, this
interest was not so "absolute" as to "exclu[del
or
40
subordinat[e] ...other interests."
The Court reiterated that
states should give deference to free exercise claims, declaring
that "only those interests of the highest order and those not
otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free
exercise of religion."41 It was not until the Smith ruling, which
came down almost three decades after Sherbert, that the Court
decided to take a different approach to free exercise
jurisprudence.
B.

Free Exercise Jurisprudence:The Smith Approach

Employment Division v. Smith,4 2 decided by the Supreme
Court in 1990, was a case involving two members of the Native
American Church who lost their jobs after ingesting peyote for
sacramental purposes as part of a religious ceremony.43 Peyote is
a "controlled substance" under Oregon law, and thus, possessing
it is considered a crime.4 4 In addition to being fired from their
jobs, the plaintiffs were deemed ineligible for unemployment
benefits by Oregon's Employment Division "because they had
been discharged for work-related 'misconduct.'
The Oregon
Supreme Court sided with the plaintiffs, applying the compelling
interest test established in Sherbert.4 6
Justice Scalia, writing for a 5-4 majority, overturned the
Oregon Supreme Court's decision, seemingly abandoning decades
of well-settled free exercise doctrine as well, though Sherbert and
its progeny were not explicitly discarded.4 v Instead, the majority
concluded that the Court had "never held that an individual's
religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise
valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate."48
"4'

39 Id. at 210-11.
40

Id. at 215.

41

Id.

42

494 U.S. 872 (1990).

43 See id. at 874.
4

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

45 Id.
46 Id. at 875.
47 See Bonventre, supra note 23, at 1411.
4

See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79.
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As the Court explained, "[T]he right of free exercise does not
relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and
neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law
proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or
proscribes).' "" Thus, strict scrutiny and the compelling interest
test are only applied in situations in which a law is not a "neutral
law of general applicability," even in cases in which the law
incidentally burdens individuals' free exercise of religion.
Justice Scalia did leave a ray of hope for proponents of a
robust free exercise doctrine, however: He explicitly stated that
Smith's holding did not overturn Court precedent,5 0 including the
Court's decision in Sherbert.5 ' In order to support this assertion,
Justice Scalia established three exceptions to the new "neutral,
generally applicable" rule: the hybrid rights exception, the
church autonomy rule, and most importantly for the purposes of
this Note, the "individualized governmental assessment
exception."52
C.

The "IndividualizedGovernmental Assessment Exception"
The "individualized governmental assessment exception"
originated from Justice Scalia's attempt to distinguish Smith
from Sherbert, without having to overrule Sherbert. 3 He noted
that the Sherbert test, unlike the Smith test, "was developed in a
context that lent itself to individualized governmental
assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct," and thus is
best understood to "stand for the proposition that where the
State has in place a system of individual exemptions, it may not
refuse to extend that system to cases of 'religious hardship'
without compelling reason."5' 4 Here, Justice Scalia was referring
to the fact that unlike Smith, in which the law at issue was an
"across-the-board criminal prohibition on a particular form of
conduct," 5 the law in Sherbert was based on the state's judgment
concerning what constituted "good cause" for turning down

49 Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)
(Stevens, J., concurring)).
50 Id. at 878-79.

5' Id. at 884.
52 See generally Smith, 494 U.S. 872.
53 See
54 See
55 Id.

Duncan, supra note 29, at 1184-85.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 884 (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986)).
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available work. 6 In such a situation, the state could not create
exemptions for individuals motivated by secular reasons while
denying similar exemptions for religious reasons, unless of course
the state had a compelling interest in doing so, because the state
would essentially be making a subjective value judgment
favoring secular motivations over religious ones.
Hence, the Sherbert compelling interest test lives on in free
exercise jurisprudence, though in a "transfigured state."" It
applies in those circumstances in which the government makes
individualized assessments regarding a law's applicability to a
certain individual or group, which is why some scholars believe
the exception is simply a branch of Smith's general applicability
requirement. 9 Whether or not the "individualized governmental
assessment exception" is simply a branch of general applicability,
the fact remains that the Court in Smith did little to shed light
on the scope of this rule. Thus, lower courts have interpreted it
both narrowly and broadly, with some strictly limiting its
application to unemployment compensation cases like Sherbert,"
and others applying it in cases in which the law at issue allows
for no government discretion, but includes built-in categorical
secular exemptions.
The Supreme Court did address the "individualized
governmental assessment exception" in one other case following
Smith. In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah,61 a case involving a Florida animal cruelty statute
penalizing anyone who killed any animal "unnecessarily," the
Court held that although the law appeared to be neutral and
generally applicable on its face, in actuality it represented "a
See generally Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.

57 See

" See Duncan, supra note 29, at 1185.
'9 See Duncan, supra note 25, at 861.
60 Though most courts have
expanded the "individualized governmental
assessment exception" beyond unemployment compensation cases, there are some
that have refused to do so. See, e.g., Gary S. v. Manchester Sch. Dist., 374 F.3d 15,
18 (1st Cir. 2004) ("The Smith majority expressly limited ...Sherbert to the
unemployment compensation field."). Courts that have limited the exception to the
unemployment compensation field have largely done so in response to Justice
Scalia's statement in Smith, in which he wrote that the Court "ha[s] never
invalidated any governmental action on the basis of the Sherbert test except the
denial of unemployment compensation.... In recent years we have abstained from
applying the Sherbert test (outside the unemployment compensation field) at all."
See Smith, 494 U.S. at 883.
61 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
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system of 'individualized governmental assessment of the
reasons for the relevant conduct,'" in that it allowed the
government to determine whether or not killing an animal was
"necessary" in a particular instance.6 2 The plaintiffs practiced
Santeria-a religion requiring animal sacrifice-and the
regulatory scheme in question was used in such a way as to
solely prohibit this sort of animal killing, but not others.6 3 The
City of Hialeah failed to provide a compelling interest for this
discriminatory regulatory scheme, and thus, the Court struck it
down. 64 Once again, however, the Supreme Court declined to
define the limits of the exception.

II. INTERPRETATION IN THE LOWER COURTS
The open-endedness of the "individualized governmental
assessment exception," as well as the seemingly boundless
number of circumstances to which it could potentially apply, have
made for disparate results in the lower courts. These lower court
decisions can generally be broken down into two categories:
(1) those that interpret the exception rather narrowly, limiting
its application to select circumstances, generally in which the
government exercises some sort of discretion; and (2) those that
interpret it broadly, applying it in cases dealing with a variety of
circumstances in which the government has granted either
individualized or categorical exemptions, or both.
A.

The Narrow Approach
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit is
among those courts that have viewed the "individualized
governmental assessment exception" as being relatively limited
in scope. In Swanson ex rel. Swanson v. Guthrie Independent
School District No. I-L, 65 a home-schooled student and her
parents brought suit against the local school district, alleging
that its refusal to allow her to attend classes part-time violated
her free exercise rights. 66 The only recognized exceptions to the
full-time attendance requirement in this school district were
"strict categories of students, all of whom ha[d] one characteristic
62

See id. at 537 (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 884).

63 See id. at 526.

See generally 508 U.S. 520.
135 F.3d 694 (10th Cir. 1998).
66 Id. at 696.
64

65
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in common-the state of Oklahoma recognize[d] them as
students for purposes of calculating the amount of financial aid
to provide to the school district." 67 Thus, all other home-schooled

students who failed to meet that requirement were deemed
ineligible for the exception.6" When faced with the plaintiffs'
individualized assessment exception argument, the court first
expressed its uncertainty as to whether the Sherbert test even
continued to apply outside the unemployment context. 69 The
court then went on to conclude that even if the Sherbert test was
still valid outside of that context, "[t]he school board's
policy... [did] not establish a system of individualized
70
exceptions that give rise to the application of a subjective test."
Here, the court construed the individualized governmental
assessment test narrowly, suggesting that it is inapplicable in
situations in which the exemptions in question are "strict
categories" of people defined in the law itself, rather than
individualized exemptions determined on an ad hoc basis at the
discretion of the state.
The Tenth Circuit reaffirmed this interpretation of Smith's
"individualized governmental assessment exception" in Grace
United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne,71 in which it held
that a zoning board's determination that a church could not
establish a daycare facility in a residential zone, despite the fact
that the zoning ordinance did allow for some "objective
exceptions" to the residential zoning requirements, was not a
violation of free exercise.72 Once again, the court relied on the
fact that there were categorical exemptions to the zoning
requirements, and thus, the zoning law did not amount to a
system of ad hoc subjective decisions. 73 The court emphasized
that although there were several exemptions to the zoning law,
there was no exemption for daycare facilities, whether run by
67

Id. at 701.

6

Id.

Id.
Id.; see also Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1297 (10th Cir. 2004)
(explaining that the "individualized governmental assessment exception" is limited
to cases in which the decision to exempt an individual or organization from a
particular law is discretionary and made on a case-by-case basis, and does not apply
to cases in which the law contains objective categorical exemptions).
7' 451 F.3d 643 (10th Cir. 2006).
" See id. at 654.
69

70

71 See id. at 655.
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secular or religious organizations, and thus, the government did
not make a value judgment disfavoring religion."4 Essentially,
the court held that until the board, at its discretion, decided to
allow a secular daycare facility to fall under a zoning exemption,
the denial of a religious organization's proposal to build a
daycare facility was acceptable.
The court pointed out that this holding is consistent with
several other circuit court decisions in the land use context,
noting that the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits
have all held that "although zoning laws may permit some
individualized assessment for variances, they are generally
applicable if they are motivated by secular purposes and impact
equally all land owners in the city seeking variances."" Thus,
some courts have held that the fact that a governmental entity
uses discretion in granting an exemption is not conclusive in
terms of whether the "individualized governmental assessment
exception" applies. 6
Even when discretion is used, the
"individualized governmental assessment exception" is triggered
only when the regulatory system is applied in a discriminatory
manner.7 7 Therefore, under this interpretation, since no secular
daycare facility had ever been granted an exemption from the
zoning law, Grace United Methodist Church's complaint had no
merit.
Various district courts have also taken the narrow approach
when interpreting the "individualized governmental assessment
exception." For example, in Rader v. Johnston,7' a case involving
a devoutly religious student's challenge to a state university's
rule requiring all full-time freshmen to live on campus,7 9 the
United States District Court for the District of Nebraska

"' See id. at 654 ("Although the City of Cheyenne's zoning ordinance allows for
limited objective exceptions in the LR-1 zone (such as churches, schools, and other
similar uses) the regulation bars any organization or individual from operating a
daycare center in this residential zone, for either secular or religious reasons.").
15 See id. at 651 (citing First Assembly of God of Naples, Fla., Inc.
v. Collier
Cnty., 20 F.3d 419, 423-24 (11th Cir. 1994), modified, 27 F.3d 526 (11th Cir. 1994)
(per curiam)).
76 Id. ("Consistent with the majority of our sister circuits,... we have already
refused to interpret Smith as standing for the proposition that a secular exemption
automatically creates a claim for a religious exemption." (citing Axson-Flynn v.
Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1297 (10th Cir. 2004))).
77 Id. at 653-54.
78 924 F. Supp. 1540 (D. Neb. 1996).
71 See id. at 1543.
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distinguished the school's discretionary exemption from the
categorical exemptions enumerated in the rule itself8 0 The court
held that it was the discretionary exemption-which enabled the
university to grant exceptions for "significant and truly
exceptional circumstances which would make living on-campus
not the three expressly enumerated
impossible" 8 -and
exemptions8 2 that placed the plaintiffs claim within Smith's
"individualized governmental assessment exception. 8 3 Since the
discretionary exemption was applied in a manner that
discriminated against religiously motivated individuals, the
compelling interest test applied. 4
Similarly, in Brock v. Boozman, 5 the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas rejected the plaintiffs
assertion that the challenged law fell under the "individualized
governmental assessment exception" because it contained a
specified exemption for medical purposes.8 6 The court noted that
the central concern of "individualized governmental assessment
exception" cases is "the prospect of the government making a
value judgment in favor of secular motivations but not religious
motivations."" According to the court, a medical exemption "is
not a value judgment. 88 Instead, a specified medical exemption
80 See id. at 1551-52; see also Carol M. Kaplan, Note, The Devil Is in the Details:

Neutral, Generally Applicable Laws and Exceptions from Smith, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1045, 1082 (2000).
"I See Rader, 924 F. Supp. at 1546 (internal quotation mark omitted).
82 The three enumerated exemptions to the university's housing policy were:
(1) students who were age nineteen or older on the first day of class of the fall
semester; (2) married students; (3) students living with their parents or legal
guardian and commuting from within the local community, See id.
a See id. at 1551-52. The court observed that the discretionary exemption,
which contained language suggesting it would only be granted in dire circumstances,
was in practice granted for a variety of not-so-dire secular reasons, while it was
denied for religious reasons. See Kaplan, supra note 80, at 1082-83.
' See Rader, 924 F. Supp. at 1555-56.
" No. 4:01CV00760 SWW, 2002 WL 1972086 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 12, 2002).
sr See id. at *7-8. In this case, a mother objected to a law that required her
children to receive Hepatitis B immunizations in order for them to attend public
school. Id. at *1. She claimed that this law violated her religious beliefs because
Hepatitis B is most often spread through sexual contact or injection of illegal drugs,
and she did not want to teach her children that it is acceptable to be promiscuous or
to use drugs. Id. at *2. The law contained an exemption for medical reasons, but not
for personal religious reasons. Id.
87 Id. at *7 (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520, 537-38 (1993); Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City
of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 365-66 (3d Cir. 1999)).
88 Id. (citing FraternalOrder, 170 F.3d at 365).
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is simply "what the law requires of the State." 9 In other words,
an objective exemption, such as a medical exemption, specifically
enumerated in the challenged provision, is not considered a value
judgment, and thus does not trigger the "individualized
governmental assessment exception."
To
summarize, the narrow
approach
to Smith's
"individualized governmental assessment exception" essentially
depends on how analogous the challenged regulation is to the
regulation at issue in Sherbert.90 Therefore, the first step under
this approach concentrates "on whether a law contains a
mechanism similar to the 'good cause' criterion that is open to
unfettered discretionary interpretation" in Sherbert." If such a
mechanism does not exist, the "individualized governmental
assessment exception" is inapplicable. If it does exist, however,
the second step "requires courts to determine whether it is
enforced in a discriminatory manner."9 2 If no discrimination is
uncovered, the exception does not apply, and the state is not
required to justify the enforcement of its regulation with a
compelling interest. 93
B.

The Broad Approach

The broad approach to the "individualized governmental
assessment exception" views the exception as being somewhat
intertwined with Smith's general applicability requirement. In
fact, some commentators have even argued that the exception is
"nothing more than a subset of the general applicability
requirement."9 4 As mentioned, Smith asserts that incidentally
burdening religion is inconsequential so long as the law in
question is "neutral" and "generally applicable."9 5 As with the
"individualized governmental
assessment exception," the
Supreme Court has not explicitly defined a test or standard

"9 See id.

See Neustadter v. Holy Cross Hosp. of Silver Spring, Inc., 31 A.3d 1227, 1248
(Md. 2011) (reasoning that in order to establish whether the "individualized
governmental assessment exception" applies, it must be determined "whether
a... ruling is cut from the same cloth as the individualized exemptions with which
the Supreme Court in Sherbert and its progeny dealt.").
See id. (quoting Kaplan, supra note 80, at 1081).
90

92 See id.
93 See id.

9' See Duncan, supra note 25, at 861.
11 Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990).
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explaining how to evaluate general applicability challenges, but
it has provided some general guidelines. 96 Essentially, a law is
not generally applicable and is "underinclusive" when it neglects
to restrict "nonreligious conduct that endangers" state interests
"in a similar or greater degree" than the religiously based
exemption being proposed by the plaintiff.97
This rationale
appears to have been adopted by several courts using the broad
approach to the "individualized governmental assessment
exception." Under the broad approach, as is illustrated in several
cases below, even across-the-board categorical exemptions can
trigger heightened scrutiny. Also, unlike the narrow approach,
which requires proof that a system of discretionary ad hoc
exemptions is applied discriminatorily, the broad approach
generally views the mere existence of such a system as "per se not
neutral and not generally
applicable,"95
automatically
necessitating the application of the compelling interest test. 99
The Third Circuit has produced some of the most prominent
"individualized governmental assessment exception" decisions
using the broad approach.' 0 0 In one such case, FraternalOrder of
Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, the court held
that the Newark Police Department could not require two Sunni
Muslim officers to shave their beards.' 0 '
There were two
exemptions to the no-beard policy: those who could not shave
their beards for medical reasons and those who required a
departure from the rule as part of their duties as undercover
supra note 29, at 1188.
9" See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
543 (1993); see also Duncan, supra note 29, at 1189 ("[A] law burdening religious
conduct is underinclusive, with respect to any particular government interest that
justifies the law's burdensome restrictions, if the law fails to pursue that interest
uniformly against other conduct that causes similar harm to that government
interest.").
9 See Duncan, supra note 29, at 1189.
9 See Blackhawk v. Pennsylvania, 381 F.3d 202, 209 (3d Cir. 2004) ("[A] law
must satisfy strict scrutiny if it permits individualized, discretionary exemptions
because such a regime creates the opportunity for a facially neutral and generally
applicable standard to be applied in practice in a way that discriminates against
religiously motivated conduct." (emphasis added) (citing Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 537;
Smith, 494 U.S. at 884; Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of
Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 364-65 (3d Cir. 1999))).
1o0 Two of these decisions-FraternalOrder and Blackhawk-were written by
then-Judge Alito, indicating that if an "individualized governmental assessment
exception" case comes before the Supreme Court, at least one Justice will likely favor
applying the broad approach.
101 See FraternalOrder, 170 F.3d at 367.
96 See Duncan,
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officers." 2 The court admitted that the rule allowing beards for
medical reasons was not exactly an "individualized exemption" as
discussed in Smith and Lukumi, but was rather a "categorical
exemption." 103 However, the court reasoned that although "the
Supreme Court did speak in terms of 'individualized exemptions'
in Smith and Lukumi, it is clear from those decisions that the
Court's concern was the prospect of the government's deciding
that secular motivations are more important than religious
0 4 The court went on to explain that this
motivations.""
concern
was actually "further implicated" in cases involving secular
"categorical exemption[s]" than in those involving mere
"mechanism [s] for individualized exemptions."0 5
In other words, categorical exemptions are, to an extent,
actually more harmful than individualized exemptions because
there is no question that the rulemakers have already judged a
particular secular exemption as being more important than a
particular religious exemption. Furthermore, under a categorical
exemption, there is no opportunity for a religious dissenter to
apply for an individualized exemption because the only
exemptions permitted are already enumerated.
The court in FraternalOrder did make clear, however, that
the mere existence of a categorical exemption does not
necessarily indicate that a religious exemption must also be
granted. In its analysis, the court distinguished between the two
exemptions to the no-beard policy permitted by the police
department.10 6 The court explained that the undercover officer
exemption did not obligate the police department to provide a
religious exemption because "the Free Exercise Clause does not
require the government to apply its laws to activities that it does
not have an interest in preventing." 0 7 The purpose of the nobeard policy was to promote the department's "general interest in

104

See id. at 360.
See id. at 365.
See id.

105

See id. (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508

102
103

U.S. 520, 542 (1993)). In discussing the difficulty with categorical exemptions, the
court quoted Justice Kennedy's opinion in Lukumi: "All laws are selective to some
extent, but categories of selection are of paramount concern when a law has the
incidental effect of burdening religious practice." Id. (quoting Lukumi, 508 U.S. at
542).
106 Id.
'07 See id. at 366.
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uniformity."'
The undercover officer exemption did not
undermine this purpose because it had an important purpose of
its own in achieving the police department's goals.' 0 9 The
medical exemption, on the other hand, had no such redeeming
purpose; it undermined the police department's policy of
uniformity without providing any benefits."'
A religious
exemption to the policy would have undermined the policy to the
same extent as the medical exemption."' Consequently, the
police department's decision to allow only the medical exemption
was a value judgment favoring a harmful secular exemption over
an equally harmful religious exemption." 2
This broad interpretation, which seems to conflate the
general applicability standard with the "individualized
governmental assessment exception," was used once again by the
Third Circuit in Blackhawk v. Pennsylvania."3 That case dealt

with a Native American's right to possess two black bears for
religious purposes. Pennsylvania required owners of "exotic
wildlife" to apply for a specific permit and pay a permit fee in
order to keep such animals."'
The law contained both
categorical and individualized exemptions: It allowed zoos and
nationally recognized circuses to be categorically exempt from
the law, and permitted the director of the Game Commission to
"waive a permit fee 'where hardship or extraordinary
circumstance warrant[ed],' so long as the waiver is 'consistent
with sound game or wildlife management activities or the intent
of [the Game and Wildlife Code].' "1 Clearly, the plaintiff did

'0' See id.
"09 See id.

110 See id. ("The Department's decision to allow officers to wear beards for
medical reasons undoubtedly undermines the Department's interest in fostering a
uniform appearance through its 'no-beard' policy.").
111 See id. at 367 ("We are at a loss to understand why religious exemptions
threaten important city interests but medical exemptions do not.").
112 See id. at 366 ("[The medical exemption raises concern because it indicates
that the Department has made a value judgment that secular (i.e., medical)
motivations for wearing a beard are important enough to overcome its general
interest in uniformity but that religious motivations are not.").
11
381 F.3d 202 (3d Cir. 2004).
114 See id. at 205.
I" See id. (alteration in original).
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not fall under the categorical exemption, as his animals were not
was also denied an exemption under
part of a zoo or circus. He
116
waiver.
discretionary
the
Holding that the plaintiffs free exercise rights were
unconstitutionally infringed upon, the court first addressed the
"individualized governmental assessment exception." The court
analogized the waiver in Blackhawk to the discretionary
exemption in Sherbert, holding that they were almost identical in
that the "hardship" and "extraordinary circumstances"
requirements, as well as the requirement that the waiver be
"consistent with 'sound game or wildlife management activities
or the intent of [the Game and Wildlife Code],'" were
"sufficiently open-ended to bring the regulation within the
individualized exemption rule,"1'17 just like the "good cause"
requirement in Sherbert. Since the court applied the broad
approach, the mere existence of such a system of individualized
exemptions was enough to take the case outside of the scope of
Smith's "neutral, generally applicable" standard, triggering
Sherbert'scompelling interest test. 18
As in Fraternal Order, the court also established that the
categorical exemptions-for zoos and circuses in this caseprompted strict scrutiny analysis." 9 The state of Pennsylvania
listed two primary interests served by its fee requirement:
raising money and discouraging the keeping of wild animals in
captivity. 2 °
Since exemptions for zoos and circuses "work
against these interests to at least the same degree as the type of
exemption that Blackhawk [sought], "121 the court ruled that the
policy was not generally applicable, and thus strict scrutiny

116

See id.

See id. at 209-10 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id. at 210 ("[T]he waiver mechanism set out in 34 Pa. Cons.Stat.Ann.
§ 2901(d) creates a regime of individualized, discretionary exemptions that triggers
strict scrutiny."); see also id. at 209 ("[A] law must satisfy strict scrutiny if it permits
individualized, discretionary exemptions because such a regime creates the
opportunity for a facially neutral and generally applicable standard to be applied in
practice in a way that discriminates against religiously motivated conduct."
(emphasis added) (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520, 537 (1993); Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990); Fraternal
Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 364-65 (3d
Cir. 1999))).
117
118

119 See id. at 211.
120
121

See id.
See id.
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would be applied. 122 Once again, the court took the purpose of
the "individualized governmental assessment exception"-preventing the government from making value judgments
favoring secular exemptions over religious exemptions-and
applied it to the categorical exemption situation.
Other circuit courts, as well as various district courts, 123 have
also applied the broad approach to the "individualized
governmental assessment exception." For example, in Ward v.
Polite,24 the Sixth Circuit reversed the trial court's grant of
summary judgment to the defendant, partially based on its
12
"individualized governmental assessment exception" analysis.
In that case, a graduate counseling student was expelled from
her university for requesting to refer a homosexual client seeking
relationship advice to another counseling student because her
religious beliefs prohibited her from affirming homosexual
relationships. 26 The school refused to allow the referral, and
claimed that the plaintiff had violated the American Counseling
Association code of ethics. 27 According to the court, the difficulty
with this determination was the existence of considerable
evidence suggesting that the ethics code "permit[ed] values-based
referrals." 2 Not only did such referrals appear to be permitted,
the code actually enumerated at least two circumstances in
which such referrals were expressly permitted: circumstances in
which the client requested end-of-life counseling, and
circumstances in which the client could not afford to pay for the
services. 29 These two exemptions both ran afoul of the same
anti-discrimination policy as the plaintiffs requested exemption.
In the first exemption, the counselor discriminated against those
potentially wishing to end their life, while in the second
situation, the counselor technically discriminated based on
"socioeconomic status," which was expressly prohibited in the

122

123

See id. at 210-11.
See, e.g., Stormans Inc. v. Selecky, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2012)

(dealing with a law requiring pharmacists to stock and deliver a variety of drugs,
though in practice the law was primarily enforced to require pharmacists to stock
and dispense Plan B).
124 667 F.3d 727 (6th Cir. 2012).
12' See generally id.
126 See id. at 729-30.
127 See id. at 731-32.
128

See id. at 739.

129

See id.
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code, though clearly allowed when the client could not afford the
services.130
The court viewed the presence of these two
exemptions as an indication that the ethics code adopted by the
university was actually "an exception-ridden policy" that had
taken on the "appearance and reality of a system of
individualized exemptions." 13 ' Thus, if the district court, on
remand, finds that this is indeed the case, it will have to apply
strict scrutiny.
In sum, the broad approach differs from the narrow
approach in two main respects. First, in terms of systems of
individualized or discretionary case-by-case exemptions, the
narrow approach requires both a showing that the system in
question is analogous to the "good cause" criterion in Sherbert
and a showing that the system is applied in a discriminatory
manner. The broad approach, on the other hand, simply requires
a showing that a system of individualized discretionary
exemptions exists. Second, the narrow approach does not extend
to cases involving enumerated or "categorical exemptions," such
as those in Grace United, Swanson, or Fraternal Order, for
example. The broad approach, on the other hand, does extend to
such cases, requiring the application of strict scrutiny for
categorical exemptions made for secular purposes that
undermine the challenged policy to an equal or greater extent
than the proposed religious exemption. Once again, the rationale
behind this rule is that "categorical exemptions" pose an equal, or
possibly even greater, threat than "individualized exemptions" in
allowing the government to decide that secular motivations are
more important and thus worthier of an exemption than religious
motivations.
III. APPLICATION TO THE HHS MANDATE
While the ACA established universal healthcare, it is not
free from exemptions. In fact, there are a variety of exemptions
to an array of the law's many provisions. This Note only focuses
See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
id. at 740 ("At some point, an exception-ridden policy takes on the
appearance and reality of a system of individualized exemptions, the antithesis of a
neutral and generally applicable policy and just the kind of state action that must
run the gauntlet of strict scrutiny." (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 537 (1993); Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884
(1990))).
130

131 See

116
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on those exemptions affecting the implementation of the HHS
Mandate.
One exemption to the HHS Mandate that we have already
seen is for those that fit under the HHS Mandate's definition of a
"religious employer." This, of course, is a categorical exemption
religious
exempts
qualified
because
it
categorically
132
There are two other relevant categorical
institutions.
exemptions that must be scrutinized: the exemptions for
"grandfathered health plans" 3 3 and for small businesses. 3 4
There is also a discretionary exemption that must be examined:
the ability of the Secretary of HHS to "waive part or all" of the
tax penalty imposed on those institutions neglecting to comply
with group health plan requirements in some way. 35 A court's
approach-narrow or broad-to the "individualized governmental
assessment exception" could very well change the outcome of a
case challenging the HHS Mandate. Predictably, a court's use of
the broad approach will greatly increase the chances that the
HHS Mandate will be found to violate the Free Exercise Clause,
while those chances severely diminish under the narrow
approach.
A.

The "IndividualizedExemption"

1.

The Tax Waiver
As mentioned, the tax waiver is a discretionary or
"individualized exemption" to the HHS Mandate. In order to
weigh the likelihood that a religious objector to the law would
succeed on a free exercise claim, it must be determined whether
this exemption falls under the scope of the "individualized
governmental assessment exception," triggering strict scrutiny,
or whether it falls under the scope of Smith, triggering a much
more deferential standard. As discussed earlier, one of the
serious quandaries non-exempt religious employers face is the
crippling tax penalty that results from a decision to refuse to
comply with the HHS Mandate. The ACA imposes "a tax on any
C.F.R. § 147.131(a) (2014).
See Health Coverage Rights and Protections: Grandfathered Health

1302See 45
3

Insurance Plans, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/health-care-lawprotections/grandfathered-plans/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2015).
134 26 U.S.C. § 4980H (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13 (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 18024
(2012).
Ms'See 26 U.S.C. § 4980D(c)(4).
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failure of a group health plan to meet [group health plan
requirements]."136 As a review, group health plans, with limited
exceptions, are required to cover preventive services enumerated
by HHS. 1 37 Those refusing to comply will be taxed "$100 for each
day in the noncompliance period with respect to each individual
to whom such failure relates.' ' 3 '
This tax can be waived,
however, at the discretion of the Secretary of HHS. According to
the statute, "li]n the case of a failure which is due to reasonable
cause and not to willful neglect, the Secretary may waive part or
all of the tax ...to the extent that the payment of such tax would
be excessive relative to the failure involved."1 39 This rule gives
the Secretary the discretion to determine in which cases, if any,
the failure to pay the tax is "reasonable," and how much of the
tax, if any, should be waived.14 ° There is no question that this
waiver creates a system of individualized exemptions; the
question is, does this mean the "individualized governmental
assessment exception" applies?
Under the narrow approach, the answer to this question
depends on the circumstances. Once again, the narrow approach
requires both the existence of a system of individualized
exemptions analogous to that in Sherbert, as well as proof that
this system is applied in a discriminatory manner."' The tax
waiver is most definitely analogous to the "good cause" criterion
in Sherbert, because it is completely discretionary. It allows the
HHS Secretary to determine what constitutes a "reasonable
cause" for failing to pay the tax, just as the board in Sherbert
determined what constituted "good cause" for refusing
employment.
As for whether the waiver is applied in a
discriminatory manner, it is too early to tell. Until religious
objectors to the HHS Mandate can prove that the Secretary has
waived the tax on a case-by-case basis for secular reasons in a
manner that undermines the enforcement of the HHS Mandate
to an equal or greater extent than a waiver for religious reasons
would, the waiver is not discriminatory. Consequently, as of

136 See id. § 4980D(a).
137 See supra INTRODUCTION.
138

26 U.S.C. § 4980D(b)(1).

139

Id. § 4980D(c)(4) (emphasis added).

140 See id.
141

See supra Part II.A.
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now, a court using the narrow approach would not conclude that
Smith's individualized assessment exception applies in regards to
the tax waiver.
A court applying the broad approach would likely reach a
different conclusion. Under this approach, the "individualized
governmental assessment exception" is applied, and strict
scrutiny is triggered, simply because the tax waiver creates a
system of individualized exemptions.14 2 This is the case because,
as noted in Blackhawk, "a law must satisfy strict scrutiny if it
permits individualized, discretionary exemptions because such a
regime creates the opportunity for a facially neutral and
generally applicable standard to be applied in practice in a way
that discriminates against religiously motivated conduct."143 In
other words, a law is subject to strict scrutiny just for
"permit[ting] individualized, discretionary exemptions," and for
creating the "opportunity" for discrimination. Thus, there is no
need for a system of individualized exemptions, such as the tax
waiver, to actually discriminate; the potential for discrimination
is sufficient to prompt the application of Sherbert's compelling
interest test.
B.

The "CategoricalExemptions"

1.

The "Religious Employer Exemption"

The first of the categorical exemptions, the "religious
employer" exemption, appears discretionary at first: 44 The HHS
Mandate grants HRSA discretion to "establish an exemption
from [its] guidelines with respect to a group health plan

142 See supra Part II.B.

4 See Blackhawk v. Pennsylvania, 381 F.3d 202, 209 (3d Cir. 2004) (emphasis
added) (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 537 (1993); Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990); Fraternal Order of
Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 364-65 (3d Cir. 1999)).
144 In fact, the
"religious employer" exemption was originally both a
discretionary and categorical exemption. As discussed, the definition of "religious
employer," as originally written, included the requirements that the organization
have the "inculcation of religious values as its purpose" and "primarily employU
persons who share its religious tenets." See FINAL RULES, supra note 18. Clearly,
these two criteria were discretionary in nature because HRSA would have to
determine which organizations met these requirements. Though the new definition
of "religious employer," which no longer contains these criteria, does not do much to
change the scope of the exemption, it has the effect of making the exemption appear
entirely categorical, rather than discretionary.
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established or maintained by a religious employer ... with
respect to any requirement to cover contraceptive services under
such guidelines." 14'
However, the criteria used to define
"religious employer" are categorical, rather than discretionary. 146
As discussed, a "religious employer" is defined as "an
organization that is organized and operates as a nonprofit entity
and is referred to in section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, as amended."'4 7 As noted, this narrow
definition of "religious employer" essentially limits the exemption
to houses of worship, leaving a multitude of religiously motivated
objectors subject to the HHS Mandate.14
How would a court using the narrow approach to the
"individualized governmental assessment exception" view this
exemption? Would the exemption bring the HHS Mandate under
the scope of the exception? For this particular exemption, the
answer would most certainly be no. In regards to the fact that
HRSA was given discretion to establish the definition of a
"religious employer," a court using a narrow approach in
analyzing the individualized assessment exception would have no
objection. Under the view of the narrow approach, HRSA merely
created an enumerated or "categorical exemption" to the HHS
Mandate. As in Grace United, in which the zoning law had
several "objective exemptions" for buildings such as churches and
schools, or in Swanson, in which the school only allowed a
specific category of students to attend classes part-time, 49 the
law here creates a categorical exemption for all "religious
employers," as defined in the provision. 5 ° The formation of an
exemption for "religious employers" is not, in and of itself,
discretionary; it is not part of a system of subjective, ad hoc
exemptions.
The analysis is the same for the actual definition of
"religious employer." This definition, which, once again, limits
the exemption to "nonprofit entit[ies]" referred to in
"6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986,"''
gives HRSA no discretion to determine which organizations
14" 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(a) (2014) (internal quotations omitted).
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 See generally supra note 18.
149 See supra Part II.A.
150 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(a).
151 See supra text accompanying note 147.
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qualify and which do not. Therefore, because the definition does
not create a system of subjective, ad hoc exemptions, a court
following the narrow approach would conclude that the
"individualized
governmental
assessment
exception"
is
inapplicable.
Furthermore, the fact that this exemption only applies to
"religious employers" poses another problem for those contending
that the "individualized governmental assessment exception"
should apply. As noted previously, the Supreme Court's purpose
for creating the "individualized governmental assessment
exception" was its concern that the government would be able to
judge "secular motivations" as "more important than religious
motivations." 5 2 The "religious employer exemption" clearly does
not raise this concern, as it cannot be applied to secular
institutions. It seems probable that under the narrow approach,
even if a court believed the "religious employer exemption"
somehow created a system of individualized exemptions
analogous to that in Sherbert, the plaintiff would fail to convince
the court on the discrimination front. This is because the narrow
approach's discrimination requirement is primarily concerned
with evidence that the government, at its discretion, is favoring
secular motivations over religious ones, not that it is
discriminating between religious motivations.153 That is not to
say that such discrimination between religious motivations could
not pose a problem as well,15 but it would simply not be within
the scope of Smith's "individualized governmental assessment
exception."
The broad approach to the "individualized governmental
assessment exception" could potentially lead to different results,
though a challenge to the "religious employer exemption" would
certainly not be a "slam dunk" even in front of a court using that
approach. First, the fact that HRSA was given discretion to
institute a categorical exemption for "religious employers" is
relevant under the broad approach. As discussed earlier, the
broad approach is not limited to individualized exemptions, but
rather applies to categorical exemptions as well. 55 The concern
152 See supra Part II.A-B.

See supra Part II.A.
14 Such discrimination between religious groups might pose an Establishment
Clause question, but this issue is beyond the scope of this Note.
15

1'' See supra Part II.B.

THE HHS MANDATE

20141

of a court using such an approach would be whether the
categorical exemption for "religious employers," as defined by the
HHS Mandate, undermines the purpose of the law to an equal or
greater extent than a hypothetical exemption for religiously
affiliated institutions and religious business owners not currently
covered under the exemption. 15 6 According to HHS, the purpose
of mandated contraceptive coverage is to address women's
"unique health care needs" and burdens, eliminate the disparity
between men and women that exists in the workforce due to
unintended pregnancies, and remove the greater out-of-pocket
costs that women, as compared to men, are forced to incur for
contraceptive coverage. 15 7 Plainly, any exemption to the HHS
Mandate would undermine this purpose.
However, like in
Fraternal Order or Blackhawk, the court must also examine
whether the exemption furthers another governmental
interest. 5 8 Here, it can be argued that the exemption furthers
the governmental interest of preserving the rights of houses of
worship to be free to practice their religious beliefs without
government interference. If this is indeed an interest of the
state, however, the same could be said for the exemption sought
by religious institutions and religious business owners not
covered by the exemption.
Though the "religious employer exemption" undermines the
purpose of the HHS Mandate, and only debatably furthers a
different governmental purpose, this does not necessarily
indicate that a court using the broad approach would construe
the exemption as triggering strict scrutiny. While it is true that
the categorical exemption for "religious employers" acts against
the purpose identified by HHS, the extent to which the exemption
acts against the law is also significant. 5 9 HHS argues that its
"religious employer exemption" undermines the HHS Mandate to
a lesser extent than a broader exemption would, because in only
exempting nonprofit religious institutions that fit under the
definition set forth in section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the
Internal Revenue Code, it is limiting the exemption to a smaller
group consisting primarily of houses of worship. 160 Furthermore,
156

See supra Part II.B.

157See FINAL RULES, supra note 18.
158

See supra Part II.B.

159 See supra Part II.B.
160

45 C.F.R. § 147.131(a) (2014); FINAL RULES, supranote 18.
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it is more likely that such institutions would employ members of
its own faith who would be less likely to seek contraceptive
coverage in the first place. The same cannot necessarily be said
for religious institutions or businesses owned by religiously
devout individuals, which are much more likely to employ and
serve individuals of other faiths. HHS's contention that its
narrow "religious employer exemption" undermines the HHS
Mandate to a lesser extent than an exemption that would include
other religious objectors definitely has some merit, though the
assumption that those who share the religious tenets of an
exempted "religious employer" will not use contraceptives may
not always be correct. However, it is logical to expect that
contraceptive use would at least be lower in such circumstances.
Hence, even under the broad approach to the individualized
assessment exception, religious objectors to the HHS Mandate
would face a challenge in convincing the court to apply strict
scrutiny in regards to the existence of the categorical "religious
employer exemption."
Grandfathered Health Plans

2.

The second of the "categorical exemptions" that must be
analyzed is the "grandfathered health plan exemption." This
exemption, as the name suggests, applies to so-called
"[g]randfathered health plan coverage," or coverage "provided by
a group health plan, or a group or individual health insurance
issuer, in which an individual was enrolled on March 23, 2010."161
As long as the qualifying plans "maintains [its] status" 162 under
the rules provided, it may generally keep the coverage that it had
on the date the ACA was passed, though there are some
provisions of the ACA that apply to all health plans, including
"grandfathered plans." 6 3 Coverage for preventive services is not
included in those provisions that apply to grandfathered health

See 45 C.F.R. § 147.140(a)(1)(i). For more information on the "grandfathered
health plans," see generally id. See also Health Coverage Rights and Protections:
GrandfatheredHealth InsurancePlans,supra note 133.
162 45 C.F.R. § 147.140(a)(1)(i).
161

16

See THE KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH

EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS 190 (2012) [hereinafter
BENEFITS], availableat http://ehbs.kff.orgpdf/2012/8345.pdf.
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plans, and thus, companies qualifying as "grandfathered" are not
required to cover the preventive services enumerated by
164
HRSA.
It is easy to predict how the narrow approach to the
"individualized governmental assessment exception" would
interpret the "grandfathered exemption."
Under such an
approach,
the "individualized governmental
assessment
exception" is limited to cases involving a system of subjective, ad
hoc exemptions.165
The "grandfathered exemption" does not
amount to such a system. All health plans that qualify as
"grandfathered" are exempt from the HHS Mandate. Thus, the
government exercises no discretion in determining an
organization's exempt status, and from the perspective of the
narrow approach, plays no part in favoring secular motivations
over religious ones, as both secular and religious institutions can
qualify for "grandfathered health plans" if they meet the
requirements.
A court applying the broad approach to the "individualized
governmental assessment exception" would likely not be so
dismissive of the "grandfathered exemption." Just to review, this
approach also applies to "categorical exemptions" as long as these
exemptions meet certain criteria. 166 The enumerated exemption
must apply to secular motivations that undermine the challenged
policy to an equal or greater extent than the denied religious
motivations. 16 7 Once again, the rationale behind this rule is that
"categorical exemptions" pose an equal, or possibly even greater
threat, than "individualized exemptions" in allowing the
government to decide that secular motivations are more
important than religious motivations.1 68
With "categorical
exemptions," the government merely makes a value judgment
favoring secular motivations in a different manner and at a
different stage of the game than in the case of individualized,
discretionary exemptions, but it still makes a value judgment all
the same.

"' See Health Coverage Rights and Protections: Grandfathered Health
Insurance Plans,supra note 133.
165 See supra Part II.A.

See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part II.B.
168 See supra Part II.B.
'8
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When analyzing the "grandfathered exemption" in light of
cases such as Fraternal Order and Blackhawk, it is rather
apparent that under a broad approach to the "individualized
governmental assessment exception," the exception, or at least
its functional equivalent-the failure of the general applicability
First of all, the "grandfathered
requirement-would apply.
exemption" acts against the purpose of the HHS Mandate, at
least to the same degree, if not to a greater degree, than the
proposed religious conscience exemptions. While it is true that
the "grandfathered exemption" serves the governmental purpose
of allowing individuals and businesses to keep the current plan
they like, as well as providing "stability and flexibility to insurers
and businesses that offer insurance coverage as the nation
transitions to a more competitive marketplace,"1 69 this does not
outweigh the degree to which the exemption undermines the
HHS Mandate. In 2011, fifty-eight percent of covered workers
were enrolled in a "grandfathered health plan."17 0 In 2012, this
number decreased to forty-eight percent,' 7 ' in 2013 it decreased
to thirty-six percent, and in 2014 it decreased to twenty-six
percent.'7 2 As indicated by the pattern in the last few years, it is
likely that the number of workers enrolled in such plans will
continue to decrease as various businesses neglect to, or decide
not to, continue to meet the requirements to retain
"grandfathered health plans." Even so, a sizable percentage of
the workforce will likely remain covered under these plans for
the next few years. Even if just ten percent of the workforce
remains under "grandfathered health plans," that would mean
that over fourteen million Americans would be covered by such
It is difficult to argue that allowing religiously
plans.'73

169 See Stephanie Cutter, The Grandfather Regulation-What They're Saying,
WHITE HOUSE BLOG (June 15, 2010, 5:20 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/

06/15/grandfather-regulation-what-theyre-saying.
17 See EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS, supra note 162.
171 See id.
172

2014 Employer Health Benefits Survey, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Sept.

10, 2014), http'//kff.org/report-section/ehbs-2014-summary-of-findings/.
113As of January 2015, the employed U.S. workforce consisted of approximately
148,201,000 people. See Press Release, Bureau of Lab. Stat., Employment Situation
Summary Table A. Household Data, Seasonally Adjusted-January 2015 (Feb. 6,
2015), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.a.htm.
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motivated exemptions will undermine the HHS Mandate to a
greater extent than a secular exemption that impacts millions of
Americans.
Furthermore, if the government is truly very concerned with
making sure women's preventive services are available to the
greatest extent possible, it could have required "grandfathered
health plans" to cover them as well. There are various provisions
of the ACA, such as that requiring the extension of dependent
health coverage to age twenty-six, from which even
"grandfathered plans" are not exempt. 74 Refusing to exempt
"grandfathered health plans" from the requirements of the HHS
Mandate probably would not undermine the purposes of such
health plans-allowing individuals and businesses to keep their
preferred plans, and providing stability and flexibility-any more
than requiring them to comply with provisions such as the
dependent health coverage provision mentioned above would.
Consequently, it would be difficult for the government to
convincingly contend that a "categorical exemption" for
"grandfathered plans" is any less harmful to the purposes of the
HHS Mandate than an exemption for religious motivations would
be. Indeed, this appears to be a perfect example of a scenario in
which the government has made a value judgment favoring a
secular motivation over a religious one, despite their equally
harmful impacts on the challenged law's policy goals.
3.

Small Businesses
The final "categorical exemption" from the HHS Mandate
that must be examined is the small business exemption. Under
this exemption, employers employing less than fifty full-time
employees are exempt from providing health coverage, including
coverage for preventive services. 171
As with the "grandfathered health plan exemption," it is easy
to predict how the narrow approach to the "individualized
governmental assessment exception" would interpret the small
business exemption. Once again, under such an approach, the
"individualized governmental assessment exception" is limited to
cases involving a system of subjective, ad hoc exemptions. 17 6 The
174 See EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS, supra note 163.
175 42 U.S.C. § 18024 (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13

(2012).
176

See supra Part II.A.

(2012); 42 U.S.C. § 4980H
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small business exemption is not such a system because all
qualifying small businesses are exempt from providing health
coverage. Consequently, the government does not exercise
discretion in determining a business's exempt status, and from
the perspective of the narrow approach, fails to favor secular
motivations over religious ones, as both secular and religious
institutions can qualify as small businesses exempt from
providing preventive services if they meet the requirements.
The analysis is very different under the broad approach,
Under that approach, the "individualized
however.
governmental assessment exception" very likely applies because
the small business exemption infringes upon the purpose of the
HHS Mandate to the same degree, or likely even to a greater
degree, than a potential religious conscience exemption would.
While exempting small businesses furthers the government's
goal of ensuring that small businesses are not overly burdened by
the requirements of the ACA, it is difficult to argue that this
purpose outweighs the extent to which the exemption will
undermine the HHS Mandate. Approximately ninety-six percent
of all U.S. businesses, or 5.8 million out of 6.0 million total
businesses, have fewer than fifty employees, and thus are exempt
77
from the requirements of the ACA and the HHS Mandate. 17
8
These businesses employ almost thirty-four million Americans.
While it is true that small employers choosing to provide health
coverage for their employees must comply with the requirements
of the ACA, 179 including the provision mandating coverage of
preventive services, less than thirty-six percent of private
businesses with fewer than fifty employees offered health
Therefore, even excluding small
insurance as of 2011.180
businesses that choose to provide health insurance, there are
millions of Americans working for small businesses that will
Thus,
continue to receive no employer-provided coverage.
considering the number of women who will not receive free
David Francis & Eric Pianin, 7 Ways Businesses Can Dodge Obamacare,
FISCAL TiMES (July 1, 2013), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2013/07/O1/7Ways-Businesses-Can-Dodge-Obamacare.aspx#page 1.
178 Id.
179 ObamaCare Small Business Facts, OBAMACARE FACTS, http://obamacare
facts.com/obamacare-smallbusiness.php (last visited Jan. 31, 2015).
180 Percent of Private Sector Establishments That Offer Health Insurance to
Employees, by Firm Size, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., httpJ/kff.org/other/state-indicator/
177

firms-offering-coverage-by-size/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2015).
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contraceptive coverage due to the small business exemption, it is
virtually impossible to contend that a religious conscience
exemption would undermine the purpose of the HHS Mandate to
a greater extent. Hence, a court using the broad approach to the
"individualized governmental assessment exception" would view
the "small business exemption" as an inappropriate value
judgment in favor of a secular motivation over a religious one,
particularly in view of the fact that the secular exemption most
likely undermines the purpose of the HHS Mandate to a greater
degree than the proposed religious one.
CONCLUSION

While the Supreme Court chose to rely on RFRA to reach its
decision in Hobby Lobby, this Note demonstrates that a free
exercise analysis could have quite possibly led the Court to a very
similar result.
Such an analysis could have also had the
additional benefits of more thoroughly defining the scope of the
rather
elusive
"individualized governmental
assessment
exception" and bringing free exercise jurisprudence closer to its
more vigorous pre-Smith state, assuming the Court would have
chosen to adopt the broad approach to the exception.
Considering that Justice Alito, who authored both Blackhawk
and FraternalOrder, wrote the Hobby Lobby decision, it seems
probable that the Court would have adopted such an approach if
it had decided to take that route. If the Supreme Court decides
to hear additional HHS Mandate cases, it is likely that it will
once again base its decision on RFRA. However, plaintiffs would
be remiss to ignore the potential strength of the "individualized
governmental assessment exception" argument. If the Court
decides to address that argument, its effect could ultimately be
much greater than any decision based on RFRA because RFRA
can be amended by Congress, as some Democratic congressmen
have already suggested, while no such threat exists in regards to
the Free Exercise Clause.

